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Reviewed by Carlo Salzani, Monash University 
Animality and Human Nature 
I. Politics of Imagination 
In his influential 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, published as 
The Lives of Animals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and later included 
as two chapters of the novel Elizabeth Costello (London: Vintage, 2004), J. M. 
Coetzee, via his fictive alter-ego Elizabeth Costello, virulently attacks philosophy for 
its inability to “think” the “lives” of (nonhuman) animals. Philosophy, Costello 
argues, is trapped in a “vast tautology” whereby (human) reason is considered the 
being of God or of the universe and human beings its only interpreters. Philosophy’s 
axiom goes as follows: 
The fact that through the application of reason we can come to understand the rules by 
which the universe works proves that reason and the universe are of the same being. 
And the fact that animals, lacking reason, cannot understand the universe but have 
simply to follow its rules blindly, proves that, unlike man, they are part of it but not 
part of its being: that man is godlike, animals thinglike. (Costello 67) 
Costello counters that reason seems to her “merely the being of the human brain”: 
“reason looks to me suspiciously like the being of human thought; worse than that, 
like the being of one tendency in human thought. Reason is the being of a certain 
spectrum of human thinking” (Costello 67). Philosophy, grounding its understanding 
merely on reason, seals itself off from the possibility of reaching out to other forms of 
life: something, it argues, “we can never accomplish because our minds are 
inadequate to the task” (Costello 76).            
To this “tragically restrictive” self-exclusion of philosophy, Costello opposes the 
power of imagination, “the sensation—a heavily affective sensation—of being a body 
1
Salzani: Salzani on Pick, Payne, McHugh
0
  
BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 10, Number 1 (Fall 2012) 
with limbs that have extension in space, of being alive to the world.” Imagination 
breaks the tragically restrictive limits of reason and philosophy insofar as, for 
Costello, there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being 
of another, “[t]here are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination,” and therefore there 
is no limit to the way we can think (or, better, imagine) our way into the existence of 
nonhuman animals, of any being with whom we share the substrate of life (Costello 
78, 80). For this reason, “poets,” unlike philosophers, are better suited to explore the 
human engagement with other forms of life: poetry “does not try to find an idea in the 
animal, [. . .] [it] is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement 
with him.” And this in spite of the poets’ philosophical position or intention, since 
what really matters in this kind of poetry (or art in general) is that its consciousness is 
not “abstract” but rather “kinetic,” that it invites us to imagine our way into the way of 
inhabiting another body: “writers teach us more than they are aware of. [. . . ] [They] 
show us that we too can embody animals—by the process called poetic invention that 
mingles breath and sense in a way that no one has explained and no one ever will” 
(Costello 96, 97-98). 
Of course Coetzee’s statements cannot be taken simply at face value: after all he 
cannot be made to coincide fully with Elizabeth Costello. Moreover, the form in 
which these statements are delivered (a fictive narrative and not a philosophical 
argument) is not less important than the statements themselves, and his book also 
stages, in a Bakhtinian way, poignant objections to Costello’s arguments. These 
complex issues about the “politics of imagination” have prompted an intense debate 
and a voluminous critical literature (involving both philosophers and literary 
scholars), which cannot be analyzed or even briefly summarized in this short review. 
What is important here, though, is that they have also inspired (or at least clarified the 
aims and scope of) a critical practice which seeks in literature (as well as cinema and 
the other arts) a different engagement with the “lives of animals” that will overcome 
the “tragically restrictive” limits of traditional philosophy. 
It is no surprise, then, that the three books here under review refer, at some point or 
other, to Coetzee’s powerful and groundbreaking intervention in what has come to be 
called (for lack of a better term) “Animal Studies”: Mark Payne and Anat Pick insert 
short discussions of Coetzee’s argument in their respective Introductions, and Susan 
McHugh in one of her chapters. This is not to say that these three authors fully and 
uncritically endorse Costello/Coetzee’s bold claims. Moreover, the scope and aims of 
their analyses are different and varied and cannot be reduced to a single and consistent 
critical label. However, different as they are, these three books follow (explicitly or 
implicitly) Coetzee’s suggestion and seek in literature, cinema and the arts (along with 
philosophy) a different, “deeper” engagement with the “lives of animals,” thereby 
exemplifying a bourgeoning trend within this rapidly growing new critical field. 
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II. Poetics of Creatureliness 
The most interesting, articulated and “philosophically” challenging of the three 
studies is Anat Pick’s Creaturely Poetics. Focusing on the “corporeal reality of living 
bodies,” both human and nonhuman, Pick takes as her theoretical lens Simone Weil’s 
notion of “vulnerability” as a mark of existence, and as such a precious thing, in order 
to develop the foundations of a “radical aesthetics” which implies an equally “radical 
ethics” (Pick 3). Weil postulated an interchangeability among vulnerability, reality, 
and beauty: “that which exists must be loved, and loved because it exists, because it is 
subjected to necessity” (Pick 3). Pick’s point is that if fragility and finitude possess a 
special kind of beauty, this conception is not only already inherently ethical, but it 
also delivers us beyond the domain of the human. A critical practice focused on 
creaturely vulnerability must be grounded on what Weil calls “attention”: an attention 
to the bodily and embodied which is, in itself, “antiphilosophical”: “it does not 
produce arguments or truth claims about its object”; “vulnerability as an object of 
attention does not yield a moral ‘reading’” (Pick 5). Rather, attention toward 
embodiment provides a critical space for thinking of the human outside Cartesian 
abstractionism, as rigorously material, thereby opening up to a different sort of 
aesthetics and ethics. The anonymous and elemental materiality of the body provides 
a powerful antidote to anthropocentrism, which Pick articulates into a project of 
“inhumanity” that attempts to reclaim the moving away from the human as a positive 
strategy. 
Coetzee is singled out in the Introduction precisely for having reoriented the 
philosophical discussion in animal ethics from utilitarian, reason-, and rights-based 
approaches toward what Pick calls “creaturely thinking”: now the question of the 
animal is no longer properly philosophical at all, but rather has become a “physical” 
problem, and it is here that, for Pick, Weil’s thought begins. Weil’s “vulnerability” is 
then complemented by Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “bare life,” a life stripped from 
all qualifications and consigned to the “state of exception” of (species) sovereign 
power. Unlike Agamben, however, Pick is interested not in life’s susceptibility to the 
interventions of power, but rather in the ethico-religious exploration of creaturely 
exposure, whereby life’s vulnerability or bareness offers a fundamental challenge to 
liberal humanism, both in terms of the rejection of the notion of rights and in a radical 
critique of subjectivity. Pick’s extensive and sophisticated use of Weil’s and 
Agamben’s works posits a problem, however: the recourse to Weil’s post-secular, 
intensely religious vocabulary leads Pick to postulate, as central to her investigation, 
“a sort of sacred recognition of life’s value as material and temporal” (Pick 3, 
emphasis added), intentionally ignoring Agamben’s central discussion of the 
“sacredness of life” as a fundamental power apparatus that precisely reduces life to its 
bareness (in all of his works following Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
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Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). This issue cannot be ignored (as Pick 
does) and hovers like the shadow of an unanswered question over the whole book. 
The study is divided in two parts, “The Inhumanity of Literature” and “The 
Inhumanity of Film,” each comprising three chapters. In literature, the search for 
“inhumanity,” that is, for a reconsideration of embodied creatureliness that moves 
away from the humanist project, leads Pick to analyze three texts: the Holocaust, 
William Golding’s The Inheritors (1955), and Marie Darrieussecq’s Pig Tales (1996). 
In fact, the first chapter on the Holocaust works as a sort of second introduction or 
“theoretical” chapter, since it is here that Pick engages properly with Weil’s works 
and concepts, in the context of an attempt to recuperate the project of remembrance 
from the humanist salvaging of “humanity” after the Holocaust’s “animalization.” 
This recuperation of remembrance becomes, in the second chapter on Golding, a 
recuperation of a certain kind of history, which Pick names “creaturely history”: 
Golding’s novel, in fictionalizing the extinction of Neanderthal man at the hands of 
Cro-Magnon man, attempts a retrieval of an extinct sensibility, which is concrete and 
pictorial (“kinetic,” Coetzee would say) rather than abstract, and that as such erases all 
hierarchies in the chain of life. The third chapter looks for concrete and corporeal 
“inhumanity” in the act of writing itself: Darrieussecq’s fictional memoir of a woman 
metamorphosed into a pig deploys a writing that does not express the humanistic self-
awareness of the autobiographical subject, but, in lacking self-transparency, partakes 
of the creaturely opacity of language. 
The first chapter of the second part is specular to that of the first part in that it is a 
“programmatic” or “theoretical” chapter: through a reading of André Bazin’s writings, 
Pick argues for a “creaturely cinema,” that is, a cinema that emphasizes its (inherent) 
immediacy and materiality, its “corporeal zoomorphic quality or creatureliness” (Pick 
106), which transforms all living beings, including humans, into creatures. Pick’s 
argument is, however, that cinema is in itself “creaturely”: cinematic “realism,” rooted 
in ideas of necessity and the body, necessarily surpasses the specificities of species 
identity, so that “film’s realism is its inhumanity” (Pick 115). Opposed to this 
“inhuman,” creaturely realism, there exists a powerful cinematic trend, which Pick 
names “scientific surrealism” and explores, in the following chapter, through two 
examples, Georges Franju’s Le Sang de bêtes (1949, about a slaughterhouse) and 
Frederick Wiseman’s Primate (1974, about laboratory animals): here the vulnerable 
body is not beheld in “religious” attention, but rather morbidly taken apart and 
scientifically scrutinized in the search of a surrealist, objectified, mastered kind of 
beauty. The final chapter then proposes a true cinematic poetics of creatureliness in 
analyzing Werner Herzog’s works, whose “blank gaze” creates a space in which art 
brushes against the limits of human subjectivity and form. This notion of “blank gaze” 
wraps up the proposal of the whole book, in that for Pick it is here, in the absence of 
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reciprocity and recognition (thus contra Emmanuel Lévinas and any other ethics 
grounded in criteria of subjectivity and personhood), that ethics begins: attentiveness 
is the name of this blank gaze, and “ethics takes place in the absence of the mutuality 
of looking” (Pick 172). 
III. Aesthetics of Affectiveness 
Mark Payne’s The Animal Part takes an unusual route that leads the reader to a tour-
de-force journey which spans from Greek and Roman poets (he is a scholar of 
Classics) to modernist poetry and fiction and ends with a contemporary (posthuman) 
video. The aim of the book is, as spelled out in the subtitle (Human and Other 
Animals in the Poetic Imagination), to engage the poetic representations not of 
animality in itself, but of humans’ interactions with their own animality (the “animal 
part” of the title) and with other nonhuman animals. Both are part of an attempt to 
understand the “new regimes of desire [that] are coming to occupy the contact zone 
between human beings and other animals” (Payne 145). Of the three books here under 
review, Payne’s is perhaps the more “Coetzeean,” insofar as it explicitly (though not 
so bluntly) takes up Coetzee’s argument and utilizes Costello’s expression 
“sympathetic imagination” as a guiding line for its endeavor. The introduction briefly 
surveys some (by now classical) philosophical positions, counterpoising Jacques 
Derrida’s to Lévinas’ discussion of the “face” and Coetzee’s to Thomas Nagel’s 
arguments about the power of the imagination: as in Coetzee, it is the “poets’” 
imaginative gift that allows them a unique access to the animal other that “brings it to 
life as the living being that it is within its own distinctive habitat” (Payne 22). Payne 
borrows a psychoanalytic term to qualify this gift: it is the poets’ “intense cathexis,” 
that is, the mental and emotional investment, the “affectiveness” of their approach, 
that allows them a different, deeper engagement with animal life.            
The four chapters comprising the book proceed in this manner: the first two chapters, 
united under the label “The Abject Animal,” articulate a relation to the animal based 
on aggression, first against the “animalized” poet himself, and then directed at the 
animals; the second two, labeled “Becoming Something Else,” look at different kinds 
of approaches to animal otherness which spell rather a fascination with, first, the 
animal forms of sociality, and, then, the nonhuman in the human itself. This 
progression from violence to fascination and acceptance is topped by an epilogue 
which reflects once again on the mode of “imaginative engagement” with what is 
other than human that has shaped the book’s readings. 
The first chapter looks at assertions of emotional continuity between human beings 
and other animals, particularly in the area of aggression and violence. Payne calls this 
continuity a “structure of abjection,” whereby the poet experiences, and gives form to, 
the connection to animal life as bodily displays of so-called “animal behaviors.” 
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Payne’s examples here are the Greek iambic poets, in particular Archilochus and 
Hipponax: the latter even invented a new meter expressive of abjection, which 
reverses the relationship between content and form whereby the form (and the poetic 
self) is constantly overwhelmed by the content of experience. The “abject” insistence 
on human beings’ emotional continuity with other animals marks the poet as an 
outsider; he becomes an “animal” to society, even though the “kinetic,” bodily feel of 
his meter connects him with a larger domain of animal affects. Payne jumps then to 
the American poet William Carlos Williams, who, particularly in the five-book poem 
Paterson (1946-58), regarded the Greek iambic tradition as an analogue to his own 
metrical invention: Payne identifies in Williams’ later work what he calls a 
“biopoetics of abjection, [. . .] the union of a fully mastered verse form, capable of 
registering the particularities of individual animal lives, both human and nonhuman, 
with the full thematic disclosure of the human being as one animal among others” 
(Payne 48). 
If the first chapter looked at the forms of self-understanding enabled by the 
imaginative (and “aggressive”) identification with other animals, the second chapter 
looks at the forms of self-understanding imagined (or, rather, “occluded”; Payne 59) 
by aggression toward the animals themselves. At work in this modality is what Payne 
calls an “ontological narcissism” producing fictions of unlimited destructiveness, in 
which hatred of other kinds of life than one’s own grounds the desire to destroy them. 
Payne identifies the origin of these fictions in the myth of Satan of Paradise Lost: 
Milton’s Satan, in his resentment against all other forms of life different from his own 
kind, creates the myth of human “exceptionalism,” the solipsistic fantasy of 
“categorical difference,” which translates into violence toward what cannot be 
embraced as one’s own. This myth will be fundamental for the symbolists’ infatuation 
with the “inorganic,” here exemplified by Charles Baudelaire’s poetry and Gustave 
Flaubert’s short story “La légende de Saint-Julien l’Hospitalier.” To this destructive 
narcissism Payne counterpoises the “sympathetic attentiveness” (Payne 69) he finds in 
the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins and in Ezra Pound's Cantos: the attention these 
poets theorize and practice is grounded on the insight that “human culture becomes 
humane through attention to the nonhuman” and leads to Pound’s ethical motto “to be 
men, not destroyers” (Payne 76). 
The second part of the book substitutes attraction for aggression and focuses on 
stories about human beings who try to join the society of animals and on the affects 
that cluster around the possibility that the human body can in various ways become 
animal. The third chapter analyses human attraction to the societies of animals as 
exemplified in Aristophanes’ play The Birds, in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, and in 
Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s Rigadoon. All three follow a similar pattern whereby “a 
human being in exile from his society gets a first-hand experience of an animal 
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society that exists alongside it, but participation in the alternative forms of sociality 
these animal societies offer is in the end denied to this outsider, who ends up more or 
less where he began, in splendid or abject isolation” (Payne 83). These encounters 
with animal societies (respectively birds, whales, and various escapees from a zoo 
after a World War II bombing) allow an understanding of other forms of life that goes 
beyond the fantasies of destructive aggression that motivated at the start the 
protagonists’ departure from human society. These willed attempts at forms of 
becoming other are in the end thwarted, and precisely because of their “willed” 
component; they form a prelude to the kinds of unwilled transformation examined in 
the metamorphosis narratives of the final chapter. 
The three main texts examined here, an iambic poem by Semonides—which contrasts 
the nature of women, who participate in a broad spectrum of nonhuman life, with the 
unmediated humanity of men, who don’t—Ovid’s Metamorphoses, and H. P. 
Lovecraft’s story, “The Shadow Over Innsmouth,” transpose the attraction/repulsion 
to the animal difference from the social group to the human body itself. The central 
point of Payne’s analyses here is to question the differences that set human beings 
apart from their animal others and to argue that, against the ontological anxiety that 
always leads to fantasies of destruction, it is indeed the irreducibility of human life to 
a single all-encompassing idea of the human that makes human life livable. The 
epilogue, in reading Bill Viola’s video I do not know what it is I am like, finally 
argues for a suspension of knowledge in encounters with other animals which goes 
even beyond the modes of sympathetic identification enabled by narrative fiction. The 
ethical consequences of such analyses are not explicitly explored, and the book 
ends—very unlike Coetzee’s (intentionally) overstated, dramatic claims—with a 
subdued, understated plea to “conservation” through a “love” inspired, among other 
things, by art. 
IV. Ethics of Ethology 
In Susan McHugh’s Animal Stories, Coetzee’s influential intervention is briefly 
mentioned right at the start, and then discussed (with a critical eye) in the final 
chapter. The theoretical apparatus of the book hinges, however, around different 
patterns and presents a different scope and aims: for one thing (somewhat like Payne’s 
conclusion), McHugh explicitly denies that literature has “some inherently privileged 
place” as a field of inquiry (that would be Costello’s claim); rather, she argues that 
“animal narrative underscores how, in certain historical and cultural moments, some 
literary and visual narrative forms become inseparable from shifts in the politics and 
sciences of species, such that questions about animal narratives come to concern the 
forms and practical future of all species life” (McHugh 3). Her point is thus to 
investigate some specific narrative patterns to unveil these “shifts,” in particular the 
one from models centered on “subjectivity” to new models centered on “agency,” 
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whereby this agency is spelled as a “collective” production in mixed human-animal 
relations, or what she calls “cross-species companionship” (McHugh 3). This critical 
vocabulary unveils the substantial theoretical debt McHugh owes to Donna Haraway’s 
peculiar articulation of the animal “question” (in a career spanning more than two 
decades and lately exemplified by The Companion Species Manifesto, [Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003]). Strangely enough, this debt, though repeatedly 
acknowledged, is somewhat downplayed in favor of a different theoretical filiation: 
the explicit theoretical frame of McHugh’s readings is declared to be Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of “becoming animal” (in fact much more rarely mentioned outside 
the introduction than Haraway’s vocabulary), whose structure “does not fix mutually 
exclusive or otherwise limiting alternatives, but rather sets all adrift in flows of 
interrelated potentials” (McHugh 14). 
The overall aim of the book is thus “to show how certain engagements with narrative 
configure people and animals as working together to do things that do not add up to a 
sum of individual efforts and so invite more precise considerations of agency and 
narrative form” (McHugh 5). The “companion-species relations” are explored in four 
chapters divided into two sections: Part I, “Intersubjective Fictions,” focuses on two 
models of interspecies fictions, the “service dogs/private eyes” in detective fiction 
(Chapter One) and “girl-horse” stories (Chapter Two), and Part II, “Intercorporeal 
Narratives,” on intercorporeal intimacies in questions of sex (Chapter Three) and food 
(Chapter Four). The peculiar “working unit” explored in the first chapter is formed by 
a blind detective and his service dog(s), read in the detective novels by Baynard 
Kendrick (1894-1977), in their film adaptations, and in TV series like Blind Justice 
(2005) and Sue Thomas: F.B. Eye (2002-2007). McHugh argues that these fictions 
have the potential to show how intersubjective forms transcend the terms of identity 
and assert an irreducibly social unit instead of an individual human as a more 
fundamental basis of action; however, especially in the films’ adaptations and in the 
TV series, the question of human identity is reasserted at the expense of the special 
sense of interdependence. The same pattern (and essentially the same failure) is 
identified, in Chapter Two, in narratives of girl-horse partnerships in competitive 
sports, read in Enid Bagnold’s novel National Velvet (1935), in its 1944 film 
adaptation starring Elizabeth Taylor, in the 1978 film sequel International Velvet, and 
in the Australian TV series The Saddle Club (1999-2003). 
The second part shifts the focus from the empowerment allowed by interspecies 
partnerships to the reconceptualization of “agency” mediated through cross-species 
“intercorporeal” relationships. The term “intercorporeal” here might be misleading—
as it is at times the all-too academic and opaque jargon McHugh uses—since the 
themes analyzed are not intercorporeal “relations,” but rather the destabilizing of 
normative boundaries allowed by “companion-species” relations. The topic of the 
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third chapter is sex, not (obviously) in the sense of bestiality, but rather as a means to 
disrupt the coercive heteronormative institution of sexual coupling (animal as well as 
human): reading (mainly) the novels and memoires by J. R. Ackerley (1896-1967), 
McHugh coins the term “pack sexualities” to question “closed, interiorized selves 
with identities affixed in binary terms” in order to “build alternate models using the 
mongrel sex acts of gay men, bitches, and their elusive consorts to recognize and 
elaborate the role of nonstandard forms of intimacy in public life” (McHugh 154). 
Likewise, the fourth chapter focuses on (living) meat animal (mainly pig) stories that, 
not only contest the symbolic connections between meat and living animals, but also 
point toward conditions in which “agency takes shape beyond rather than between the 
human and other bodily forms” (McHugh 170). Along with other texts, McHugh reads 
here George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Chris Noonan’s 1995 film Babe through the 
lens of Haraway’s notion of “cyborg community,” that is, of a machine-human-animal 
integration that challenges the fixity of species identity and the illusion of 
individuated agency. The Conclusion, finally, brings all these threads together in a 
plea for a “narrative ethology,” that is, a dramatic reconceptualization “not only of 
species and their stories, but also of the formal interplay between the two [. . .] that 
emphasizes embodied relations of agency and form” (McHugh 217). 
V. Ethics and the Poets 
If Pick more explicitly and compellingly explores the ethical import underlying all 
such literary and cinematic engagements with the “lives of animals,” an ethics and a 
politics are nonetheless implicit (or not fully explored) in Payne’s and McHugh’s 
studies. Diverse as they are, these three studies present, propose and exemplify a 
powerful alternative to the strictly philosophical approaches to these ethical issues, 
which, as Pick notes, “still occupy the center ground of the debate” (Pick 7). 
Literature, cinema, and the arts in general have the potential and the power to bypass 
the “tragically restrictive,” narcissistic, self-referential domain of reason that 
continues to sustain, even within the field of so-called “Animal Studies,” human 
exceptionalism and, finally, the (remains of the) humanist project. Imagination, 
sensation, attentiveness, corporeal or “kinetic” consciousness entail an ethical élan of 
their own, which “poets,” often despite themselves, deliver to us. And that is why 
these studies, like Elizabeth Costello, urge us “to read the poets who return the living, 
electric being to language” (Costello 111). 
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